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THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE AND THE JUVENILE SOLDIER DILEMMA 
Joshua A. Romero∗ 
I.    Introduction 
¶ 1 In the aftermath of a ten-year civil war, the country of Sierra Leone is undergoing 
a lengthy process of recuperation and stabilization. During the decade-long war, 
thousands of innocent Sierra Leoneans endured extra-judicial killings, torture, rape, and 
abduction at the hands of two warring factions: the Sierra Leone Government and the 
Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”). Researchers estimate that at least five-thousand 
juvenile combatants actively participated in the war.1 While many children were 
conscripted into combat, a significant segment of juvenile soldiers voluntarily 
participated in the brutalities.2  
¶ 2 At the conclusion of the war in 2000, the Government of Sierra Leone and the 
United Nations jointly established the Special Court for Sierra Leone to prosecute those 
“persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law . . ..”3 Despite this strict statutory directive, 
juveniles between the ages of fifteen and eighteen determined to be guilty of committing 
heinous war crimes are not subject to imprisonment.4 Instead, juvenile criminals will be 
“sentenced” to a truth and reconciliation mechanism, where—regardless of culpability—
they are ultimately released back into the very communities they once tortured.5   
  ¶ 3 Punishment of juvenile soldiers challenges both the rehabilitative assumptions 
of truth and reconciliation mechanisms and the propriety of informal, nonpunitive, and 
relatively short-term social control.6  In a time of widespread exploitation of children, the 
Special Court is in a unique position to establish a precedential framework for future ad 
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1 See Ismene Zarifis, Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Soldiers, 9 No. 3 HUM. 
RTS. BRIEF 18 (2002) (also noting that some estimates conclude that as many as 10,000 child soldiers 
fought in the war).  
2 See AMNESTY INT’L U.K., IN THE FIRING LINE—WAR AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 60, 61 (1999) (stating that 
children’s negative experiences with governmental armed forces was the predominant factor in the 
children’s decision to volunteer to fight).    
3 S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 4186th mtg., art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2002), available at 
http://specialcourt.org/documents/index1.html. (“Court statute”).  
4 Id. at art. 7(2). 
5Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra 
Leone, July 7, 1999, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html. (“Lome Accords”) 
(establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone in which perpetrators voluntarily 




6 See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).  
  
hoc tribunals addressing juvenile combatant issues.7 The Court’s current policy towards 
juvenile punishment makes impossible the attainment of just results and neglects to 
effectuate fundamental notions of deterrence8 and retribution.9 The current rehabilitative 
approach is laudable, but from a real politik perspective, the Sierra Leoneans’ demand for 
retributive punishment highlights the dire need for satisfactory sanctions vis-à-vis 
culpable combatants.  In the absence of such punishments, Sierra Leone will remain 
unstable and the rule of law illusory.  
¶ 4 The premise of this article is rather simple: The protection of human rights is a 
socially valuable and necessary good; as such, human rights violators must face adequate 
punishment when appropriate. Punishment must be rendered upon juvenile combatants 
who willingly desecrated human rights in Sierra Leone. The proposition that child 
soldiers were the first victims of human rights violations is a non-sequitor since this 
article advocates only that child soldiers who voluntarily joined a militia and voluntarily 
committed war crimes be susceptible to punishment. Ergo, in situations in which the 
child soldier was conscripted into warfare, punishment is proper only upon the 
conscriptor. When, however, the most culpable juveniles face no bona fide punishment, 
the decade-long war merely serves as a training ground to lead future rebellious revolts as 
skilled and undeterred leaders.   
¶ 5 This article addresses the structural shortcomings of the current Court scheme and 
offers an alternative adjudicatory regime for juvenile soldier matters. Section I outlines 
the decade-long civil war and the futile peace agreements. Section II explores the nuances 
of the Court-enabling statute and the rationale underpinning the expansive statutory 
punishment-exclusion for juveniles. Section III evaluates contemporary proposals for 
adjudicating child soldier matters and discusses why these proposals insufficiently 
address the debacle. Section IV offers an alternative organizational framework for the 
tribunal which maximizes deterrence and retribution, and establishes, inter alia, stability 
and the rule of law. The conclusion is that in order to resolve the civil unrest in Sierra 
Leone, the Court must permit discretionary imprisonment of the most culpable juvenile 
combatants, while remaining cognizant of mitigating factors such as age and immaturity.  
                                                 
7 The subject of child soldiers is of global consequence; children have taken-up arms in war for centuries. 
See Dominique Marshall, The Construction of Children as an Object of International Relations: The 
Declarations of Children’s Rights and the Child Welfare Committee of League of Nations, 1900-1924, 7 
INT’L J. CHILDREN’S RTS. 103, 133-34, n. 149 (1999) (noting that historically the French viewed children as 
heroic soldiers).  Vicious conflicts involving child combatants are on-going and widespread with over 
300,000 children, girls and boys, taking part in hostilities in over thirty countries. Olara A. Otunnu, Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict, at http://www.un.org/special-
rep/children-armed-conflict/ffaq.htm. 
8 Under deterrence theory, “punishing criminals is morally permissible because it both deters the punished 
criminals from further offenses (special deterrence) and deters other people from committing crimes 
(general deterrence).” David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1623, 1626 




9 Retributive theory posits that “punishment is just when it is deserved, and it is deserved by the 
commission of an offense. The offense committed is the sole ground of the state’s right and duty to punish. 
[J]ustice in these matters is to treat offenders according to their deserts, to give them what they deserve, not 
more, not less.” I. PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 147-48 (1989).   
  
II.       Background 
A.    The Civil War in Sierra Leone 
¶ 6 The Sierra Leonean civil war began in March 1991 amidst political upheaval over 
a multi-party democratic system of governance. Revolutionary United Front forces, 
influenced by local discontent and regional instability, attempted to overthrow the 
Government and exercise control over the country and its supreme economic resource—
the diamond mines.10 Some commentators have intimated that the true motivation for 
RUF forces was continued profit from illegal diamond trade coupled with a perverse 
enjoyment of criminal activity.11 
¶ 7 During the war, the Government was overtaken several times by intra-
governmental factions.12 Taking full advantage of the regime changes, RUF forces 
advanced on government forces, eventually gaining substantial control of the diamond 
mines.13 The Government, in turn, engaged private security firms and the Nigerian-led 
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (“ECOMOG”) to shield 
against the RUF coup d’etat.14 Government forces were minimally successful in 
containing RUF forces.15   
¶ 8 In 1996, pro-government forces successfully conducted a multi-party election and 
elected as president former U.N. official and leader of the Sierra Leone’s People’s Party, 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.16 Kabbah subsequently entered into the Abidjan peace agreement17 
with the RUF in which the government granted amnesty to RUF combatants in exchange 
for an abrupt cease-fire, disarmament, and demobilization.18 The Abidjan Accord went 
unenforced, however, and the atrocities continued.19  
¶ 9 In 1997, the Government again underwent a regime change, being replaced this 
time by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (“ARFC”).20 Mayhem ultimately 
erupted when ARFC endeavored to share command with the RUF, leading to near-
                                                 
10 See James Traub, The Worst Place on Earth, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 29, 2000, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/43.  
11 See generally Diane Marie Amann, Message as Medium in Sierra Leone, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
237, 238 (2000).   
12 See Karen Gallagher, Note, No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra 
Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 149, 156 (2000).  
13 Id. at 156.  
14 See David Pratt, Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis, April 23, 1999, at http://sierra-
leone.org/pratt042399.html (noting that “ECOMOG” entered into the war in 1994 by sending troops to 
defend the government against RUF attack); Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming 
Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 391, 394 (noting that in 
1995 the government turned to private security firms to defend, which was successful but very brutal).    
15 See Pratt, supra note 14.  
16 See Gallagher, supra note 12, at 157.  
17 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra 
Leone (RUF/SL), November 30, 1996, at http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html.  





20 Id.  
  
anarchy in the country. Regional instability prompted the U.N. to intervene and reinstate 
the Kabbah administration.21 The change did not alleviate the problem, however, since 
RUF forces maintained control of half the country and continued to launch attacks on the 
capital city of Freetown.22 By the time Government forces regained control of the capital 
following the notorious 1999 raid by RUF forces, an estimated six-thousand innocent 
civilians were left dead and thousands more mutilated and limbless.23  
¶ 10 RUF forces—comprised of thirty percent juvenile soldiers—implemented a brutal 
war operation referred to by RUF commanders as “Operation No Living Thing,” where 
rebel forces ripped through Freetown, raping thousands of women, killing innocent 
civilians, and destroying the capital city.24  This and numerous other brutal operations 
conferred upon juvenile soldiers the reputation as the cruelest combatants of the war.25   
¶ 11 Throughout the conflict, RUF forces utilized a terroristic approach stylistically 
similar to that of their chief ally Charles Taylor of Liberia.26 This terror-based strategy 
included abducting children from their homes, forcing boys to engage in war and girls to 
perform sexual services, and raiding and killing entire villages.27 Thousands of innocent 
Sierra Leoneans suffered amputation and mutilation at the hands of rebel forces.28  The 
RUF’s most notorious act of terror was chopping off the hands of those said to have cast 
votes in 1996 for pro-government candidate Ahmed Tejan Kabah.29 The Sierra Leonean 
Government, in response, adopted similarly gruesome war tactics.30    
¶ 12 During the conflict, an estimated five-thousand juvenile soldiers committed 
widespread and systematic atrocities in defiance of international conventions.31 Large 
numbers of children were coerced to participate in the war, often facing death for 
                                                 
21 See Fritz & Smith, supra note 14, at 396. 
22 Id.   
23 Id.  
24  See id. at 393. 
25 Id. The RUF conducted other operations called “Operation Burn House” which was a series of arson 
attacks and “Operation Pay Yourself” which was a program of looting. See Matthew S. Barton, ECOWAS 
and West African Security: The New Regionalism, 4 DEPAUL INT’L L.J. 79, 80 (2000).   
26 Id. (noting that Taylor and his National Patriotic Front Party utilized gruesome war tactics when they 
overran Liberia and executed President Samuel Doe).   
27 Id.  
28 See U.S. Dep’t of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sierra Leone, Feb. 25, 2000, 
§ 1, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/.  
29 See generally Norimitsu Onishi, In Looted Home In Sierra Leone, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2000, at A1 
(noting atrocities committed by rebel forces). Interestingly, this was the same practice utilized by Belgian 
colonizers who chopped off the hands of Congolese who resisted harsh plantation conditions. See 
BARBARA KINGSOLVER, THE POISONWOOD BIBLE 144, 432 (1998).  
30 See Diane Marie Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber in the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 167, 177 (2001) (noting that the government also 




31 Zarifis, supra note 1, at 19. (noting child soldier’s violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II). 
  
noncompliance.32 Some juvenile soldiers, however, acted voluntarily, serving as 
commanders and foot soldiers during executions and mutilations.33 These juvenile 
soldiers earned a reputation throughout the region as fearless and blood-thirsty killers.34 
B.    The Lome Peace Accord 
¶ 13 In July 1999, U.S. diplomats brokered the Lome Peace Accord,35 which offered 
amnesty to all combatants and endowed the RUF regime with inclusion in the new 
government in exchange for disarmament and demobilization.36  The U.N. Secretary-
General’s Special Representative caveated the accords, insisting that “international 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law” would not be protected by the amnesty proviso.37 The 
Lome Accords established various victims’ and refugees’ programs, educational 
institutions, a Human Rights Commission, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(“TRC”), a National Election Commission, and a Constitutional Review Committee.38 
Despite the expansive amnesty provision, Sierra Leonean citizens staunchly supported 
the agreement, deeming the Accords a crucial stride towards peace and regional 
stability.39 To implement the Accords, the U.N. pledged nearly six-thousand peacekeeping 
troops to the region.40  
¶ 14 Global optimism notwithstanding, trouble promptly ensued when RUF forces 
refused to adhere to the Accords and continued its brutal attacks on civilians.41 RUF 
forces failed to disarm and demobilize, and in May 2000, they took hostage five-hundred 
U.N. peacekeepers.42  U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan noted in mid-2000 that “the 
situation in Sierra Leone remained tense and volatile under conditions that resemble civil 
war.”43 In November 2000, Government and RUF forces attempted another cease-fire 
                                                 
32 See Jeana Webster, Note, Sierra Leone—Responding to the Crisis, Planning for the Future: The Role of 
International Justice in the Quest for National and Global Security, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 731, 
755 (2001).  
33 Id. at 755; see The Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915, paras. 31-38 (2000).    
34 See Michael A. Corriero, The Involvement and Protection of Children in Truth and Justice Seeking 
Processes: The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 337, 339 (2002). 
35 Lome Accords, supra note 5.  
36 Interestingly, the Lome Accords specifically granted RUF leader Foday Sankoh an absolute and free 
pardon despite his reputation as one of the most gruesome violators of human rights. The accords also 
named Sankoh as vice president of the new government and head of the diamond industry oversight board. 
See id. at art. IX(1). For negative reactions to the amnesty provisions see Norimitsu Onishi, How U.S. Left 
Sierra Leone Tangled in a Curious Web, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2000, at 6 (stating objections from Harold 
Hongju Koh, assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights; David Scheffer, ambassador at large for war 
crimes and; Julia Taft, assistant Secretary of State for refugees).    
37 See Gallagher, supra note 12, at 162.  
38 Lome Peace Accords, supra note 5.  
39 See Amann, supra note 11, at 241.  
40 See S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. SCOR, 4054th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (1999).  
41 See Bruce Zagaris, U.N. Security Council Votes to Establish War Crimes Tribunal for Sierra Leone, 16 
INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 10 (2000). 




43 See id.  
  
agreement by way of the Abaju agreement, which recommitted the parties to the Lome 
Accords.44 This effort was again futile. War continued to rage.  
¶ 15 The conflict ultimately ceased when the U.N., Britain, and the United States 
dispatched to Sierra Leone the world’s largest peacekeeping mission.45 RUF leader 
Sankoh was subsequently apprehended and has remained incarcerated in an undisclosed 
area ever since.46 Sierra Leone is currently recuperating from complete destruction and 
numerous efforts are underway to stabilize the country.  
III.       Creation of the Special Court 
¶ 16 Cognizant of the importance of regional stability, the U.N. and the Government 
of Sierra Leone jointly established the Special Court.47 The Court is a hybrid judicial 
system administered concurrently by the U.N. and the Sierra Leone Government.48 The 
Court is composed of a trial chamber, an appellate chamber, the prosecutor’s office, and 
the registry.49 The Court’s express purpose is to prosecute those “persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra 
Leonean law . . ..”50 The U.N. Secretary General has cautioned that the term “persons 
who bear the greatest responsibility” does not limit the Court’s personal jurisdiction to 
political and military leaders; it is meant to provide a prosecutorial strategy rather than an 
element of the crime.51   
                                                 
44 Id. at 10.  
45 See Douglas Farah, A Separate Peacekeeping: In Sierra Leone, Britain, U.N. Clash over Ultimate Aim, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2000, at A42; Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N.Doc. S/2002/857, para. 18 (stating that U.N. has committed 16,664 troops to 
Sierra Leone).   
46 See David Bamford, Foday Sankoh: Rebel Leader, BBC NEWS ONLINE (May 12, 2000), at 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_737000/737268.stm.    
47 This agreement is different from U.N. Security Council’s resolutions creating criminal tribunals for 
prosecution of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda because the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone is not vested with U.N. Charter Chapter VII powers which authorize the tribunal to obtain 
jurisdiction over criminals that are outside the boundaries of the country. Additionally, the Court will be 
funded “voluntarily” by U.N. member states as opposed to the tribunals created for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda which are more stably funded by mandatory assessments. Unlike the ICTY, the Special Court 
statute contains no termination date. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (“ICTY”); 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and 
other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and 
Neighboring States, between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (1994) (“ICTR”).   
48 See Michelle Sieff, War Criminals: Watch Out, WORLD TODAY (Feb. 1, 2001).  
49 Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 11.   




51 Letter from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2001/40, p. 2-3 (Jan. 12, 2001).    
  
¶ 17 The Court is staffed with local and international judges and prosecutors.52 The 
Chief Prosecutor, appointed by the U.N. Secretary General, is to make the final decision 
on indictments.53 The Court adheres to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”).54 The Court is located in Sierra 
Leone55 and imprisonment is to take place in Sierra Leone, provided that the prisons meet 
U.N. requirements, or in any third country that has signed an agreement with the ICTR or 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”).56 U.N. member 
states will voluntarily fund the Court.57 
¶ 18 Article 10 of the Court statute provides that, “[a]n Amnesty granted to any person 
falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect to the crimes referred to in 
articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.”58 This clause 
negates the broad amnesty granted combatants by way of Article XI of the Lome 
Accords.59 Some commentators have argued that RUF’s material breach of the Lome 
Accords renders the amnesty clause void;60 while others have argued that the amnesty 
clause never protected war crimes and crimes against humanity.61 Whatever the case, the 
statute does not recognize amnesty as a bar to prosecution.  
¶ 19 Arguably the most complex and contentious issue facing the Court is the mode of 
juvenile prosecution and the extent to which corporal punishment is proper. Punishment 
of juvenile soldiers challenges both the rehabilitative assumptions of the TRC and the 
                                                 
52 See Seiff, supra note 48.  
53 See Ilene Cohn, The Protection of Children and the Quest for Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone, 55 J. 
INT’L AFF. (2001).      
54 Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 14(1). 
55 See Seiff, supra note 48. A new building must be constructed as no existing location is secure or large 
enough for the Court. The cost of building the Court and renovating a prison will be approximately $3.5 
million. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915, at paras. 60-62 (2000). Some commentators view the location of the 
Court in Sierra Leone as being a great benefit to the culture, surrounding institutions and rule of law in the 
region. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 53.  Others argue that the location of a criminal tribunal is of 
fundamental importance in allowing concerned victims to participate in the proceedings and seek redress. 
See Adama Dieng, International Criminal Justice: From Paper to Practice—A Contribution from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 25 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 688, 698-99 (2002).      
56 Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 22.  
57 U.N. SCOR, 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315, at art. 8 (2000) (stating that the Court will be funded 
by voluntary contributions). The Bush Administration has pledged $5 million to the Court. See Annan Will 
Meet Cash Target for War Crimes Court, AFRICAN NEWS, July 25, 2001.  
58 Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 10. Article 2 relates to crimes against humanity; Article 3 covers 
violations of the law of internal armed conflicts; and Article 4 deals with other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. Id.  
59 Note also that the U.N. representative made a reservation to Article IX of the Lome Accords by noting 
that war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity are not protected by the amnesty clause. See 
Gallagher, supra note 12, at 162.  
60 See, e.g., Daniel J. Macaluso, Absolute and Free Pardon: The Effect of the Amnesty Provision in the 
Lome Peace Agreement on the Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 




61 See Gallagher, supra note 12, at 162.  
  
propriety of informal, nonpunitive, and relatively short-term social control.62  The debacle 
poses complex questions of culpability, justice and impunity, as well as individual and 
social healing. The Court statute mandates that child soldiers under the age of fifteen at 
the time of the crime may not face prosecution.63  The Court statute does, however, permit 
prosecution of juveniles over the age of fifteen.64 As Article 7 of the Court statute states:  
The Special Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who 
was under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission of 
the crime. Should any person who was, at the time of the alleged 
commission of the crime, between 15 and 18 years of age come 
before the Court, he or she shall be treated with dignity and a 
sense of worth, taking into account his or her young age and the 
desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration 
into and assumption of a constructive role in society, and in 
accordance with international human rights standards, in 
particular the rights of the child.65  
¶ 20 The Sierra Leonean Government and its citizenry demand punishment of all 
culpable parties, including juvenile soldiers.66 In sharp contrast, the Special Court statute 
aspires to rehabilitate and reintegrate juvenile soldiers back into their communities. 
Under the statute, a murderous combatant over the age of fifteen will face no real 
punishment.67 Pursuant to Article 7(7) of the Court statute: 
In the Trial of a juvenile offender the Court shall, in the disposition 
of his or her case, order any of the following: care guidance and 
supervision orders, community service orders, counseling, foster 
care, correctional, educational and vocational training 
programmes, approved schools, as appropriate, and programmes 
of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or programmes 
of child protection agencies.68  
¶ 21 “Rehabilitative sentencing” via the TRC69 is the most readily available alternative 
to corporal punishment.70  The TRC permits perpetrators to divulge to the Commission 
                                                 
62 See generally HART, supra note 6.   
63 Letter from the Security-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2001/40 (January 12, 2001). 
64 Id.  
65 Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 7.   
66 See Brutal Child Army Grows Up, BBC NEWS ONLINE (June 1, 2000), at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_743000/743684.stm. In fact, in negotiations to 
establish the Special Court, the Government of Sierra Leone demanded that suspects of all ages be subject 
to prosecution and that convictions carry the possibility of capital punishment. See Report of the Secretary-
General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. 
S/2000/915 (2000).    
67 See Letter from the Security-General, supra note 63; see also Amann, supra note 11, at 243. 




69 See Letter Dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the 
Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234 (2000) (noting that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
will have a “major role to play” in sentencing child soldiers).  
  
their individual roles in the war without facing punishment.71 The TRC’s paramount 
objective is to create a historical record of human rights violations committed during the 
civil war.72 TRC proponents argue that it is the most effective accountability mechanism 
for juveniles because “it allows the victim and perpetrator to heal emotionally and 
psychologically.”73 The TRC will promulgate a final report discerning the causes, nature, 
and extent of the human rights violations in Sierra Leone. The Government will 
ultimately utilize these findings to help achieve improved insight into the causal factors 
of the war so to prevent future conflicts.74   
¶ 22 The post-war landscape presents to the Court an anomalous situation: The victims 
demand severe punishment of the most culpable juvenile soldiers, while the Court statute 
seeks to rehabilitate and reintegrate the violent juveniles back into the very communities 
they once terrorized.75 In the absence of corporal punishment, this situation is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile.  
IV.       Current Proposals 
A.    Creation of a Separate Juvenile Chamber 
¶ 23 Recent proposals advocate the establishment of a separate juvenile division to 
adjudicate juvenile matters.76 A separate juvenile division, the argument goes, would 
provide a more efficient and fairer means by which to adjudicate juvenile matters and 
maximize rehabilitative goals.77 Although U.N Secretary-General Annan recommended a 
comparable children’s chamber, the Security Council expressly rejected the proposal,78 
ostensibly regarding the idea as superfluous due to the Court’s current capability of 
adequately addressing juvenile matters.79   
1.  Problems with a Separate Juvenile Chamber 
¶ 24 The major premise underlying a separate chamber is that juvenile soldiers should 
be treated disparately from adult offenders because they are somehow less culpable and 
                                                                                                                                                 
70 Lome Accords, supra note 5. The TRC became law in Sierra Leone in 2000 and the first commission is 
set up in Makeni, in Eastern Sierra Leone. See The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, 
available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcacat2000.html.   
71 Id.  
72 Zarifis, supra note 1, at 20.  
73 Id. at 21.  
74 Id. 
75 See Human Rights Watch: Children’s Rights Project, Children in Combat, 1996, at 
http://www.hrw.org/press (noting that child soldiers were made to commit atrocities against their own 
communities or families). 
76 See, e.g., Corriero, supra note 34; Amann, supra note 30. Although I agree with the conclusion proffered 
by Amann that adjudication of selected juvenile cases is appropriate, I disagree with the proposition that a 
separate juvenile chamber is the correct means to that end. See discussion below in section III A(1).    
77 See id.  
78 Letter Dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-




79 See Amended Draft Statute, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234 (2000).  
  
more easily rehabilitated.80 Advocates argue that this disparate treatment strictly 
adherences to fundamental principals of criminal justice.81 The ultimate goal of the 
proposal, however, remains rehabilitation and reintegration of juvenile soldiers into the 
very communities that demands their punishment. One commentator hopes, perhaps over-
idealistically, that the Special Court will “lay a foundation for an effective system of 
decriminalizing the conduct of child soldiers, and bring a sense of order, fairness and 
dignity to those aggrieved.”82  
¶ 25 The argument that ignoring the horrendous behavior of juvenile soldiers will 
somehow bring “order, fairness and dignity”83 employs faulty logic and is pragmatically 
troubling. How will decriminalizing systematic murder and rape bring any sense of 
fairness, order, or dignity to the victims? The supposition counterintuitive, but is blatantly 
counterfactual, ignoring Sierra Leoneans’ demand for punishment of all culpable 
combatants.  Although child soldiers are chronologically juveniles, their criminal conduct 
is indistinguishable from that of their adult counterparts. In the absence of adequate 
punishment, mayhem and social disorder will result, since “decriminalizing” criminal 
behavior negates the deterrent and retributive hallmarks of criminal law, leaving the 
victim no remedy other than self-help.   
¶ 26 Furthermore, the current proposal’s presupposition that rehabilitation and 
reintegration are attainable ends is erroneous. In Sierra Leonean society, where the 
average male life span is thirty-seven, significant responsibility is assumed at an early 
age.84 A fifteen-year-old Sierra Leonean combatant is effectively middle-aged.85 To seek 
rehabilitation at that age in the absence of punishment would at best be extremely 
difficult and often futile. Violent juvenile soldiers have forfeited the special place in life 
they enjoyed before their crimes, so that society’s benign attitude toward minors does not 
extend to embrace them.86 It is a truism that “victims of criminal acts suffer the same 
injuries, regardless of the age of the perpetrators.”87 Without an adequate deterrent, the 
statutory goal of rehabilitation of learned and experienced combatants is an unattainable 
illusion.88 To be sure, the seminal report on child soldiers, conducted by child soldier 
                                                 
80 See, e.g., Corriero, supra note 34, at 348 (“[C]hildren deserve to be treated differently from adults, that 
because of their youth they are malleable, and therefore less committed to their misconduct and more 
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81 Id.  
82 Id. at 350 (emphasis added).  
83 Id.  
84 See U.N. Development Programme, Human Development Report 2000, 137 (2000) (noting that Sierra 
Leone’s life expectancy rate is 37.2 years and contrasting the life expectancy in Canada of seventy-nine 
years).  
85 This proposition is buttressed by the fact that age is an incomplete proxy for levels of maturity during the 
years from twelve to eighteen. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Hardest of the Hard Cases: Adolescent 
Homicide in Juvenile and Criminal Courts, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 462 (1999).  
86 See, e.g., Barry Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling 
the “Rehabilitative Ideal,” 65 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1981).  
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judge can positively influence the child and thus rehabilitate her and allow the child to “develop” 
  
expert Graca Machel for the U.N., concluded that “[i]t is difficult if not impossible, to 
achieve reconciliation without justice.”89 Unpunished criminals produce justice for no 
one; the victim’s grievances go unnoticed and unaddressed, and the criminal actor 
remains unattached to community norms and unscathed by disapproval. As a pragmatic 
matter, “[t]here can be no peace without justice, no justice without law, and no 
meaningful law without a court to decide what is just and lawful under any given 
circumstance.”90 A fundamental ingredient inherent in any notion of “justice” is 
punishment for a wrong. 
¶ 27 Deterrence and retribution must be the Court’s primary objectives to realistically 
achieve stability in the country. Rehabilitation is a laudable goal, but given Sierra 
Leoneans’ demand for punishment, it must exist as a secondary objective.91 In a country 
where juvenile soldiers deem human life worthless, the efficacy of rehabilitation is 
questionable, while the benefits of deterrence and retribution are more concrete. Criminal 
prosecution as a response to the mass atrocities will bring a measure of justice and 
recognition to the victims.92 Regional stability and the rule of law—the hallmark of 
democracy—necessitate the imposition of penal sanctions that maximize the deterrent 
and retributive goals of criminal law.  
¶ 28 Policymakers must also remain aware of the message that the Court conveys to 
Sierra Leoneans. That is, it is crucial that policymakers focus on the message that 
civilians ultimately understand from the Court’s policy rather than what policymakers 
intend.93 Inherent in a policy of strict adherence to rehabilitative principals is the message 
that murderous criminals will go unpunished, and will instead be “counseled” on the 
government’s dime and then placed back into the very communities they tortured. 
Victim’s families will be left to grieve with nothing save unresolved loss, mourning, and 
want for justice. The victim’s family—by human nature—will resort to their own forms 
of retribution, usurping the Special Court’s role and taking justice into their own hands, 
thus continuing the vicious cycle of violence in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the strictly 
rehabilitative approach will teach future rebels that at the conclusion of war, 
rehabilitative benefits will accrue and no real punishment will be rendered. Subtextually, 
the current approach conveys a message that a new era of accountability is unrealistic, 
and when criminal accountability appears unrealistic to society, there is little hope for 
                                                                                                                                                 
character). I take issue with this conclusion based on the author’s heavy reliance on the judge as a role 
model and the judge’s essential place in making rehabilitation succeed. Deterrence and retribution are the 
key elements in correcting the criminal behavior of a juvenile. The judge’s role is that of an unbiased third 
party, rather than a “father figure.” Furthermore, the article seems to lose sight of the real victim and place 
emphasis on the culpable juvenile as the victim—which is not the case.     
89 Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the expert of the Secretary-General, Ms. Graca Machel, 
submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 48/157, P 34, U.N. Doc. A/51/306, 51st Sess., Item 108 
of the provisional agenda (1996) (hereinafter “Machel Report”).  
90 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STEP TOWARDS WORLD PEACE: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 30, 31 (1980).  
91 But see Amann, supra note 30, at 182 (arguing that the primary goal of rehabilitation can be maximized 
through the use court trials).  
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stability, especially in a region recovering from a decade-long civil war. As one learned 
commentator has noted, “[p]unishing those responsible for the atrocities in Sierra Leone, 
by conveying a concrete message of accountability, may begin to break that cycle of 
violence.”94        
2.   Infeasibility of a Separate Juvenile Chamber 
¶ 29 The Court’s scarce resources significantly hamper the potential for a separate 
juvenile’s chamber. The Court is funded through voluntarily contributions from U.N. 
member-states.95 The U.N. originally planned to raise $32.2 million for the initial start-up 
and first-year of the Court, and $84.4 million for the next two years.96 The United 
Nations, however, endured significant problems raising the capital and consequently 
drastically reduced the budget to $16.8 million for the first year for a total of $57 million 
over the Court’s first three years.97 Juxtaposed to the ICTR and the ICTY, which 
respectively receive $80 and $96 million annually, the Special Court is on a tight-rope 
budget.98 As a practical matter, “it will be very difficult for this Court to look productive 
given the [financial] constraints it will have operating in Sierra Leone.”99 In light of the 
significant costs related to U.N. employees living in Freetown,100 additional U.N. 
personnel to staff a separate juvenile court simply is not feasible. The costs of separate 
trials in a separate court, which would be held to international standards, would quickly 
deplete the Court’s minuscule budget.101   
¶ 30 Moreover, prosecution of juveniles under the Court’s current structure would 
produce similar results without the excessive cost. The Court statute already delineates 
standards by which child combatants are to be adjudicated,102 obviating the need for a 
separate chamber. A separate chamber would merely serve a semantically-oriented 
purpose, allowing proponents to postulate that children are being treated “fairly” because 
jurisdictional power is vested in a different court, where in fact the end-results would be 
the same. To be sure, when punishing juveniles, the Special Court can only prosecute the 
most culpable violators of human rights; inclusion of child combatants within the 
jurisdictional province of the Court will not increase its prosecutorial scope. A separate 
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chamber would thus cause severe inefficiencies, hamper judicial economy, and impede 
justice in an area in dire need of swift and adequate justice.           
B.    Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the Sole Punishment    
¶ 31 Various non-governmental organizations (“NGO’s”) argue that the TRC is 
sufficient “punishment” for juvenile soldiers because prosecution would weaken 
rehabilitative efforts.103 The argument is based on the idea that prosecution stigmatizes 
defendants and adversely affects rehabilitation and reintegration. Some NGO’s presume 
that every juvenile offender was forced into warfare. From this they deduce that holding 
juveniles accountable for their vicious crimes would endanger the efficacy of 
rehabilitation.104 According to Human Rights Watch: 
Although we believe that children should be accountable for their 
offenses, in light of their inherent immaturity as well as the 
subjection of many child combatants to forcible abduction, 
brutalization and other forms of coercion, we recommend that the 
Special Court’s limited resources would be far better used in 
pursuit of justice for adult offenders, rather than children.105  
¶ 32 The statement fails, however, to articulate why the Court’s limited resources 
would be better utilized prosecuting adult combatants while granting absolute immunity 
to juveniles. More importantly is the omission of any empirical evidence—or any other 
form of evidence—that justifies complete immunity for all juvenile soldiers under the age 
of eighteen.  
1.   Problem with the TRC as the Sole Punishment 
¶ 33 The Court’s scarce resources should indeed be utilized to prosecute the most 
culpable parties, but it does not follow that a fortiori violent juveniles should go 
unpunished. The Court is directed to “prosecute those persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean 
Law . . ..”106  This clause textually confines the Court’s prosecutorial scope, making it 
rather contradictory and arbitrary to postulate that violent juveniles should be 
categorically immune from prosecution because of their status as minors to assure that 
only the most culpable parties are prosecuted.  
¶ 34 Juvenile soldiers were among the most violent actors in the war, and certain 
juvenile combatants voluntarily assumed key leadership roles.107 The unambiguous text of 
the statute should be effectuated irrespective of the artificial adult/minor dichotomy.108 
                                                 
103 See Amann, supra note 30, at 167.  
104 Id. (noting objections to child prosecutions by United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Amnesty 
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the Court). 
105 Human Rights Watch, Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone: Letter to United Nations Security 
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106 Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 2.  




108 Although those under the age of fifteen should not be prosecuted. See discussion infra.  
  
One must recognize that “[t]he continuation of the artificial juvenile/adult 
dichotomization has [historically] resulted in a disservice to the public safety.”109 It is the 
proper role of the Court to determine who is “most responsible” for the mutilations, 
rapes, and extra-judicial killings. If a juvenile soldier is one of the most culpable parties 
then appropriate punishment is necessary.110        
¶ 35 The TRC permits juveniles to disclose their violent crimes to the Commission 
without facing any form of punishment.111 If rehabilitation is the main concern, one 
should consider the rehabilitative theory of criminal law: Imprisonment benefits the 
criminals themselves by reforming their characters so they are no longer motivated to 
engage in crime.112 Concededly, the TRC plays a valuable role in documenting the 
atrocities, but it is an idealistic fantasy to intimate that the Commission suffices as 
punishment for violent criminals. Moreover, sufficient documentation of war crimes can 
be accomplished through trial mechanisms.113  
¶ 36 While one may justifiably seek emotional repair and rehabilitation for criminals 
via the TRC, the Court’s paramount objectives must be deterrence and retribution. The 
only juveniles potentially facing punishment are those who voluntarily and intentionally 
committed war crimes.114  The true victims in this situation are not the murderers, but the 
grieving families and innocent civilians on the receiving end of the crime. Encouraging 
dangerous criminals to disclose their crimes without punishment will not prevent another 
war; it will merely serve as an opportunity to “reintegrate” until the next coup d’etat 
presents itself. The then-child soldier now becomes an experienced and undeterred leader 
of a lawless faction.  
¶ 37 More subtly, what happens when a violent juvenile soldier is “reintegrated” into 
society and upon minimal provocation reverts to learned and unpunished war-like tactics? 
This scenario is sure to come to fruition if undeterred criminals are merely interviewed 
and released back into the very society they tortured. Will the criminal actor continue to 
avoid punishment? Or is punishment permissible at this point? The answer must be that 
punishment should occur at the time of the original crime to prevent subsequent crimes.   
¶ 38 Admittedly, rehabilitation, when properly executed, negates some of the expected 
draconian reactions of juvenile soldiers, but not all of the adverse affects of non-
punishment are alleviated. Withstanding complete rehabilitation, the fact still remains 
that victims’ wrongs will not be righted absent putative sanctions vis-à-vis those 
                                                 
109 See P. STRASBURG, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG 
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110 Note that most expert believe that under the current statute most child soldiers will not face prosecution 
because of their subordinate roles. See Barbara Crossette, Sierra Leone to Try Juveniles Separately in U.N. 
Tribunal Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2000, at A7.  
111 See Lome Peace Accords, supra note 5.  
112 Dolinko, supra note 7, at 1626.  
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rather than depending on the “unchecked” word of the perpetrator. Furthermore, the facts behind the crime 
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responsible.  The practical result of unredressed wrongs is regional instability as victims 
seek vindication by any means. If the Court is unable to prosecute the most culpable 
criminals, including juveniles, the goals sought by the Court—accountability, regional 
stability, and the rule of law—will remain unattainable.             
2.   Juvenile Punishment is Consistent with International Norms 
¶ 39 As a basis for blanket immunity for juvenile soldiers, proponents postulate that 
putative punishment of juveniles runs counter to international norms.115 If, however, one 
looks at the enabling statute for the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)—the epitome of 
international norms—punishment of juvenile criminals for crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and other horrific crimes is permissible.116 Moreover, many nation-states have 
implemented adjudicatory procedures for juveniles charged with conduct that would be 
criminal if committed by an adult.117 In determining punishment, Western nations have 
for some time treated violent juveniles as adults.118 More compelling, however, is non-
Western acceptance of juvenile punishment.119 The fact is that prosecuting juvenile 
soldiers for their gruesome war crimes is in conformity with international norms and 
necessitated by the delicate post-war situation in Sierra Leone.   
V.     The Appropriate Solution 
¶ 40 The Court must promote the integrity of the criminal law and assure 
accountability. To this end, the most effective solution is to treat juvenile soldiers (at least 
fifteen years old) similar to their adult counterparts upon a finding that they voluntarily 
joined a warring faction and voluntarily committed heinous crimes. The gravamen of the 
two-prong requirement is that the soldier possessed the requisite mens rea to join a 
warring faction and the mens rea to commit the crime. This high standard of criminal 
liability normatively corresponds with international criminal law jurisprudence, which 
requires one to possess an undiminished capacity to exercise free will in choosing 
between right and wrong.120 The second essential element is the age constraint: The child 
soldier must have been at least fifteen years old at the time of the crime’s commission.121 
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121 This article argues that the Court should look at the combatant’s age at the time of commission of the 
crime rather than the age at the time of voluntarily joining the faction. This is because the crime (as 
opposed to indoctrination into the faction) is the actus reus with which we are primarily concerned.    
  
Although “line-drawing” with regard to age and punishment is intrinsically arbitrary, it is 
necessary to effectuate the rule of law.122 Fifteen years of age is the minimum age under 
the current Court statute for prosecution123 and it was until recently the minimum age for 
recruitment into armies pursuant to the most widely ratified international convention.124 
Furthermore, fifteen years of age has been deemed an appropriate age for prosecution by 
Western and non-Western nations alike.125  
A.    The Proper Framework  
[O]ne of society's most basic tasks is that of protecting the lives of 
its citizens and one of the most basic ways in which it achieves the 
task is through criminal laws against murder.126 
¶ 41 The Special Court’s primary purpose is to punish those most responsible for 
grave human rights violations.127 The most culpable parties for the summary executions, 
rapes, mutilations, and other horrific crimes must face severe punishment for their 
actions.   
¶ 42 While great significance should not be placed on rehabilitation and reintegration 
absent a punitive response, it is nonetheless a worthwhile ancillary goal. Despite 
skepticism surrounding the efficacy of rehabilitation and reintegration without 
“justice,”128 it nonetheless may be an attainable goal where the juvenile’s culpability is 
minimal. Furthermore, given the Court’s limited resources, rehabilitative measures will 
have to suffice as “punishment” for minimally culpable parties. Paramount attention and 
resources must be expended prosecuting the most culpable parties.129  
¶ 43 To that end, proposed below is a procedural design for an ad hoc criminal 
tribunal in Sierra Leone that maximizes judicial economy and efficacy. The adjudicatory 
process consists of an initial fact-finding phase conducted by the prosecutor, followed by 
a trial when appropriate, and concludes with a sentencing phase, at which time the Court 
considers mitigating factors including age and immaturity. The adjudicatory process is 
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the same for both adult and juvenile offenders, although the Court will formulate 
additional inquiries in juvenile cases. The macro-level focal point is on regional 
stabilization and the establishment of the rule of law by way of deterrence and 
retribution. To this end, the Special Court should follow the lead of the ICTY and impose 
“imprisonment to protect society from the hostile, predatory conduct of the guilty 
accused.”130     
1.   The Fact-Finding Phase 
¶ 44 The adjudicatory process for adult and juvenile soldiers should initially consist of 
a thorough fact-finding phase comprised of a preliminary investigation, legal analysis of 
the discovered facts, and a determination of prosecutorial success. The prosecutor should 
consider the culpability of the offender to determine whether punishment is warranted. 
The prosecutor must meticulously explore the nature of the crime and the suspected 
perpetrator to settle on the correct response. At the forefront of the prosecutorial decision-
making process must be the Court’s express statutory purpose of prosecuting only the 
most culpable combatants.131 This statutory limit necessarily fixes the prosecutor’s outer-
boundary in the fact-finding phase and serves to check unfettered discretion.132 The 
prosecutor should consider mitigating factors established by the Court.133 Only if there is 
clear and convincing admissible evidence to prove that the combatant voluntarily 
participated in the conflict should the investigative phase proceed.  
¶ 45 Despite the pragmatic attractiveness of this approach, some commentators have 
argued that the judge in the case should serve as the prosecutorial decision-maker.134 This 
proposal, however, is extremely problematic in terms of procedural and substantive due 
process. To be sure, if a judge is permitted to evaluate a crime and determine the validity 
of the charge prior to hearing the case, the judge is no longer an unbiased adjudicator; the 
judge will have inevitably made a premature determination that the defendant is (or is 
not) culpable to some degree and should (or should not) face prosecution. Inherent in the 
prosecutorial decision-making process is the determination that the defendant is 
(in)sufficiently guilty to even face trial. The intermingling of the judicial and 
prosecutorial roles in the fact-finding phase permits the judge to take undue consideration 
of inadmissible evidence at trial. This approach directly contradicts rudimentary 
principals of fairness and due process—essential elements of any fair trial.135 The 
                                                 
130 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, P1232, Trial Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/judgment/index.htm.   
131 See Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 2.  
132 Note that prior to appointment as a prosecutor, a thorough investigation should be conducted to alleviate 
the problem of conflicts of interest or bias in decision making. This, in conjunction with the statutory limit, 
will substantially negate abuse of discretion by prosecutors in determining who to prosecute.  
133 For a discussion of the mitigating factors that the Court should consider in adjudicating child combatant 
cases see discussion infra in section 3.  




135 See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR 61st mtg. 
(1989) (noting fundamental Due Process rights of children); see, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 
5XX (1966) (noting critical role of fair procedure and full investigation in satisfying the basic requirements 
of due process and fairness in juvenile offender cases). 
  
prosecutor must retain broad prosecutorial discretion pursuant to the current Court 
statute.136  Prosecutorial decision-making allows a fair determination of the legal 
sufficiency of a charge while liberating the judge from pretrial bias.137  
¶ 46 When the accused is a juvenile, the prosecutor should first determine the manner 
in which the combatant became involved in the warring faction, namely whether 
association was voluntary or involuntary. This inquiry is critical since many juveniles 
were conscripted into battle.138 Cases involving conscription should not be prosecuted due 
to the actor’s diminished capacity to exercise free will. Prosecution in these cases would 
not effectuate the statutory purpose.    
¶ 47 Concededly, a determination of the voluntary nature of inculcation may be 
complicated in situations where child soldiers joined a faction out of economic 
desperation.139 Illustrative of this complexity are the remarks of an eight-year-old orphan 
who fought in Sierra Leone and Liberia: 
There, there was tribal war. There, street children like me became 
child soldiers . . .. Small soldiers had it all. They had 
Kalashnikovs. Kalashnikovs, those are rifles invented by a Russian 
that shoot without stopping. With Kalashnikovs, child soldiers had 
it all. They had money, even American dollars. They had shoes, 
military stripes, radios, caps, and even cars, called 4 by 4’s. I 
cried, ‘Walahe! Walahe!’ I wanted to go to Liberia. Quickly.140  
¶ 48 The determination of volition must be made on a case-by-case basis, rather than a 
through a bright-line rule effectively allowing juveniles to avoid prosecution upon 
concocting a claim of “constructive coercion” via impoverishment. The prosecutor 
should consider the extent of poverty suffered and the causal connection between poverty 
and association with the faction. Prima facie the factual undertaking seems daunting, but 
recall that only those parties most responsible for the atrocities will be prosecuted, which 
necessarily limits the scope of inquiry.141 Although contemporary thought dictates that the 
intentional taking of a life without justification requires a punitive response when the 
offender has even minimal appreciation for the nature of her acts and their 
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consequences,142 this is unachievable given the Court’s limited scope and resources.143 As 
a protection to defendants, a determination of volition by the prosecutor is not a per se 
preclusion from raising the issue at trial as an affirmative defense.  
¶ 49 If the juvenile was abducted and forced to engage in battle, culpability is minimal 
and the investigation should cease. If, however, clear and convincing evidence indicates 
that the juvenile voluntarily joined the faction—uninfluenced by coercive measures—the 
investigative phase should continue.  
¶ 50 The prosecutor’s next consideration is the volitional nature of the commission of 
the alleged crime. Investigation should halt when a child voluntarily joined a faction but 
was forced to commit a crime, since the actor lacked the requisite mens rea. Although the 
combatant is culpable of the actus reus of joining the faction, culpability is minimal 
because this actus reus was coerced.144  
¶ 51 If the combatant intentionally committed the crime, the prosecutor should 
conduct a severity determination. If the alleged crime is of overall de minimus 
significance and prosecution would not further the Court’s statutory purpose,145 the 
investigation should cease. Determinative factors may include: the gravity and severity of 
the crime, the effects of the crime on civilians, the violent nature of the crime, and the 
extent to which the crime violated international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean 
law. The excuse that “some young people failed to exercise their evolving capacity to 
determine right from wrong in Sierra Leone” 146  should not preclude prosecution when 
the above-mentioned factors exist. If a thorough investigation reveals that a juvenile 
bears the greatest responsibility and that all acts were committed voluntarily, the Court 
should conduct a full trial.  
2.   The Trial Phase 
¶ 52 The trial should resolve the factual determinations made during the investigative 
phase. The defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”147 The soldier should receive the assistance of competent counsel throughout the 
proceedings.148 The burden of proof and production remains on the prosecution except 
where the defendant is attempting to prove an affirmative defense, such as coercive 
indoctrination or insanity. The Rules of Evidence adopted from the ICTR will govern the 
                                                 
142 See Zimring, supra note 85, at 438.  
143 Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 7(7).  
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145 To prosecute those parties most responsible of the atrocities. Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 7.   
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Olara Otunnu, Rights: U.N., Sierra Leone Agree on War Crimes Court, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 5, 
2000.  
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generally Institute of Judicial Administration, American Bar Ass’n, Standards Relating to the Prosecution 
Function and the Defense Function (1971); Institute of Judicial Administration, American Bar Ass’n, 
Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (1968).   
  
admissibility of evidence.149 When the defendant is a juvenile, the Court must follow the 
prescribed statutory standards and treat all child soldiers “with dignity and a sense of 
worth . . . in accordance with international human rights standards . . ..”150 The 
adjudicatory phase should “ensure that the most recalcitrant and feared young offenders, 
those perhaps least likely to seek programmatic and therapeutic support, are brought into 
a credible system of justice . . .”151 and tried before an impartial tribunal. The Court must 
“examine each offender’s personal responsibility for the harm done, not only the degree 
of harm to the victims.”152  
¶ 53 Upon a finding of guilt, the adjudicatory process should continue to the 
sentencing phase. When a defendant is found not guilty, the Court should issue a 
memorandum opinion stating that the defendant underwent a full and fair trial and was 
found not guilty. The opinion could be published in a local paper to shred the clouds of 
public doubt and make reintegration more plausible.   
3.   Sentencing Phase 
¶ 54 The sentencing phase embodied in the current Court statute is the most 
noteworthy flaw in the Court’s institutional design. Currently, it is impermissible to 
imprison a guilty juvenile between the ages of fifteen and eighteen.153 A culpable juvenile 
may only be assigned to a rehabilitative mechanism—typically the TRC—where the only 
“punishment” rendered is voluntary disclosure of the crimes.154 Upon “rehabilitative 
punishment” the convicted criminal is placed back into the very community she 
terrorized and the very community that demands her punishment.155  
¶ 55 In determining the proper sentence, deterrence should guide the Court. The Court 
must send a message through the prospect of imprisonment that violent behavior in 
contravention of international social norms156 will be adequately punished. Imprisonment 
will signal to potential murderers that society will assuredly respond—and harshly so—to 
their actions.157  
                                                 
149 Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 14(1). 
150 Id.  
151 Otunnu, supra note 6, at 129.  
152 Lawrence A. Vanore, Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors: Contemporary Standards 
and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 764 (1986).  
153 Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 7(2).   
154 See Letter from the Security-General, supra note 63.  
155 Id.  
156 I refer to international social norms because the current war-intensive social norms established in Sierra 
Leone during the decade long conflict are the very evil sought to be abolished by the Special Court. As I 
mentioned above, during the civil war it was socially normal for a child to take up arms and fight, whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily. See Corriero, supra note 34, at 351-52. International norms must be imposed 
because for participants in mass atrocities, “criminal conduct that is normally characterized as ‘deviance’ is 
transformed into acceptable, even desirable, behavior.” Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can 
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¶ 56 The deterrent effect of imprisonment will benefit all Sierra Leonean citizens. 
Imprisonment will specifically deter the perpetrator from taking up arms against her 
fellow citizens and convey the message that violence is an unacceptable means of dispute 
resolution. As the Machel Report stated, “[u]nless those at every level of political and 
military command fear that they will be held accountable for crimes and subject to 
prosecution, there is little prospect of restraining their behaviour . . ..”158 Furthermore, the 
stigma of indictment attached to juvenile combatants will incapacitate them by 
discrediting their leadership potential and undermining their future political influence.159 
Imprisonment will also deter Sierra Leoneans from perpetrating crimes. Such punishment 
disincentivizes citizens from criminal behavior as a means of ameliorating grievances.  
¶ 57 Retributive goals should supply the second guiding principal for the Court.  As 
the United States Supreme Court has stated:  
[t]he instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and 
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice 
serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society 
governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized 
society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders 
the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of 
anarchy of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.160  
¶ 58 The establishment of social stability necessitates the need for citizens to feel that 
true justice was served.161 The only civilized alternative to victims’ desire for revenge is 
official rendering of justice.162 It is a truism that adequate “[p]unishment must be one of 
the appropriate responses of any legal authority . . .”163 especially for a legal authority 
seeking to establish governmental legitimacy and the rule of law.  
¶ 59 Victims are particularly unlikely to believe that “justice” was fulfilled when 
convicted killers are “sentenced” to merely disclose the killings and subsequently 
released. The notion underlying retribution is that collective societal retribution vis-à-vis 
combatants will render the victims less likely to pursue self-help measures that would in 
and of themselves violate international humanitarian law.164 In the absence of official 
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(stating that as hoc tribunal indictees “will become international pariahs”); see also Akhavan, supra note 
156, at 7 (noting that individual leaders have been undermined by prosecution by ad hoc courts).  
160 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
161 See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 26 (1999) (noting that a trail in the 
aftermath of mass atrocities could mark an effort between vengeance and forgiveness); Amann, supra note 
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162 See Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) 
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164 See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 159, at 1968.  
  
retributivism, regional stability will remain an unattainable fiction. If rehabilitative 
measures are the only “punishment” rendered then retributive goals cannot be met.165  
¶ 60 The judge must have broad discretion in determining the appropriate punishment 
of juveniles. To minimize the risk that imprisonment will be imposed on a capriciously 
selected group, however, generalized standards should be formulated to focus the judge 
on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant.166 The judge should 
consider the gravity of the crime, the manner in which it was committed, mitigating 
circumstances such as age and immaturity, the minor’s attitude toward society and 
respect for the rule of law, and the prospect for a future constructive life in light of the 
circumstances.167   
                                                 
165 See Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2070 
(1998) (arguing that some penalties may be too light to meet retributive goals).    
166 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 (“in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty would be imposed on a 
capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to be guided by standards so that the 
sentencing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant.”)  
167 See Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Note, Sentence Blending and the promise of Rehabilitation: Bringing the 
Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 259 (1999). Additional relevant considerations, as 
proposed by the American Law Institute, may include:    
(3) Aggravating Circumstances:  
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony involving 
the use or threat of violence to the person.  
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another murder.  
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.  
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in 
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to 
commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, 
burglary or kidnapping.  
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest 
or effecting an escape from lawful custody.  
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.  
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional 
depravity.  
 (4) Mitigating Circumstances.  
   (a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.  
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance.  
(c) [omitted]  
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant believed to 
provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.  
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and his 
participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.  
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.  
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality 
(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 




(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime. A.L.I., Model Penal Code § 210.6 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).  
  
¶ 61 The Court should recognize as mitigating factors age and immaturity.168 
Acknowledgement of age and immaturity as mitigating factors is quite distinct from 
granting juveniles blanket immunity. Under the mitigating-factor regime, one’s prison 
term is discounted by age and immaturity.  The most conceptually solid approach to 
mitigation is what criminal law scholars have termed the “discounting strategy.”169 The 
initial inquiry of the discounting approach is the punishment of an adult offender for the 
same crime.170 The punishment of the hypothetical adult offender is then “discounted” by 
a predetermined percentage reduction for the youthful offender.171 In a nutshell, the 
discounting strategy operates as follows:  
If adult burglars with particular criminal histories typically get 
four years of penal confinement at sentencing, the way to calculate 
the appropriate penalty for a fifteen-year-old burglar is to 
determine a discount from the secure confinement sentence of an 
adult that is appropriate for fifteen-year-olds and then apply it. If, 
on average, conditions of diminished responsibility for fifteen-
year-olds should produce a fifty-percent punishment reduction, one 
calculates the punishment of the fifteen-year-old by multiplying the 
adult sentence times 1.0 minus the discount, or in this case: 4 years 
x (1.0-.5)= 2 years. 172              
¶ 62 Discounting is directly dependent on the adult penalty for the type of punishment 
and its duration.173 One method of calculation is to discount certain types of crimes by 
predetermined percentages, e.g., all juvenile murderers are entitled to a thirty percent 
punishment reduction. Alternatively, a general rule could require all sentences rendered 
upon juvenile combatants be discounted by “x” percent irrespective of the crime. The 
discounting approach is attractive because the greatest benefits are reaped by the 
youngest offenders. For example:   
A fourteen-year-old offender would receive . . . 25 percent of the 
adult penalty; a sixteen-year-old defendant, 50 percent; and an 
eighteen-year-old, the adult penalty, as is presently the case. The 
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169 Zimring, supra note 85, at 459-63 (in-depth discussion of the discounting strategy for sentencing 
juvenile offenders); see Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth 
Violence, in 24 YOUTH VIOLENCE 189, 246-47 (Michael Tonry & Mark H. Moore, eds., 1998) (suggesting 
discounting method for juveniles in criminal court); see also BARBARA DANZIGER FLICKER, INSTITUTE OF 
JUD. ADMIN. & AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 2 
(1977) (suggesting discountive methodology for juveniles in a juvenile court).  
170 Zimring, supra note 85, at 459-63.  
171 Id. The proper percentage reduction must be determined the legislature, or in this case, the Sierra 
Leonean Government and the United Nations.   




173 Id.  
  
“deeper discounts” for younger offenders correspond to the 
developmental continuum of responsibility.174  
The traditional discounting approach uses the same age-based discounts for all categories 
of offenses and liability.175    
¶ 63 In recognition of normative international standards, juveniles should not face the 
death penalty.176 Although the Government of Sierra Leone initially demanded the death 
penalty for juveniles,177 the additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions states that 
“[t]he death penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of 
eighteen years at the time of the offense.”178 Western nations have imposed a somewhat 
similar ban on the juvenile death penalty.179 Without squarely addressing the issue, suffice 
it to say that external justifications (if nothing else) necessitate rejection of the death 
penalty in juvenile cases. The Special Court should adhere to international norms 
regarding juvenile death penalty policy in order to maintain international and domestic 
legitimacy. Great divergence from international norms would harvest unnecessary 
criticism for the Court.   
B.   Benefits of the Proposed Adjudicatory Framework  
1.  Economic and Judicial Efficiency 
¶ 64 The adjudicatory framework proposed in this article is more economically 
efficient than the creation of a separate child’s court.  The Special Court’s restricted 
resources must be utilized for the solitary purpose of prosecuting those who bear the 
greatest responsibility, not on additional personnel and administrative expenditures that 
would flow from a separate child’s chamber. There is no legitimate rationale for creating 
a separate chamber which would inevitably produce identical results.180 Instead of 
creating a children’s court antithetical to the Court’s purpose, the TRC should remain the 
primary forum for soldiers not among those most responsible for the atrocities. 
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180 Both courts would treat child soldiers with “a sense of dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account 
his or her young age . . . in accordance with international human rights standards, in particular the rights of 
the child.” Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 7(2).    
  
Functionally, the TRC renders the proposed child’s court inapposite and would be a 
complete misuse of very limited funds.181  
¶ 65 Furthermore, empowering the Court to imprison the most culpable juveniles will 
avoid expenditures on rehabilitative measures via a child’s court, which are already 
provided for by the TRC. With the establishment of the TRC, there is no acceptable 
rationale for using the Court’s resources to adjudicate all juvenile case when the statute 
dictates that “rehabilitative measures” must be rendered upon guilty juveniles regardless 
of the crime.182 By allowing the Court to imprison the most culpable combatants and using 
the TRC to “rehabilitate” the less culpable, the Court’s limited resources can be used for 
essential investigations and adequate fact-finding procedures. These available resources 
will help assure prosecution of only the most culpable combatants and provide a fair and 
thorough trial.   
2.   Comparative Institutional Advantage  
¶ 66 The Special Court is the best-equipped institution to address the most violent 
juvenile soldiers. The proposed institutional design gives the Court a comparative 
advantage over other alternatives, with legally trained professionals and staff to 
determine the culpability of an individual on a case-by-case basis and determine proper 
punishment.  
¶ 67 The Special Court is institutionally designed to treat all parties—both victims and 
perpetrators—fairly and justly. Each soldier brought before the Court is afforded 
fundamental due process rights including the opportunity to a have full, fair, and 
unbiased trial. A fair trial by a competent court gives Sierra Leoneans assurance that 
justice was rendered. Victims and defendants can trust that the Court has rendered fair 
results. Victim belief that adjudication is fair is essential to regional stability and the rule 
of law. In the absence of judicially-administered punishment, mayhem and conflict will 
prevail and a true democracy will remain impossibility.  
¶ 68 Arbitrarily assigning violent juveniles to rehabilitative programs—such as the 
TRC—provides fairness and justice to no one. Under the current paradigm, the victims 
definitively know that a convicted juvenile will not receive the deserved punishment.183 
Where the Special Court does not defer to the citizen’s basic demands for fairness and 
justice, the entire legal system will fail.   
¶ 69 The current regime is also unfair to juvenile perpetrators who are arbitrarily 
assigned to rehabilitative programs.  Child combatants are entitled to a full and fair trial. 
It is fundamentally unfair to force a juvenile to come before the TRC and appear guilty in 
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183 This is because the current Court statute states that convicted child soldiers may not face imprisonment 
and can only be “sentenced” to rehabilitative programs. See Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 7(2).    
  
the public’s eyes when in-fact she may not be. The proposed solution permits a tribunal 
to determine guilt and the proper sentence if required, rather than following an arbitrarily 
predetermined sanction, such as is the case with the TRC. A sentencing restriction is 
inherently unfair to the soldier in whose interest it may in be to develop a customized 
sentence which encompasses multi-faceted punishment mechanisms. All parties suffer 
where justice is unnecessarily restricted.   
3.   Establishment of the Rule of Law 
There can be no peace without justice, no justice without law, and 
no meaningful law without a court to decide what is just and lawful 
under any given circumstance. The process of codification, 
adjudication and enforcement is as vital to a tranquil international 
community as it is to any independent national state.184  
¶ 70 The most fundamental element of a stable and prosperous nation is the rule of 
law. The essential premise underlying the rule of law is that “respect for the rule of law 
will create respect for legal processes and an internal moral barrier against conduct that 
legal institutions have condemned.”185 Establishing respect for the law in Sierra Leone is 
the quintessential step to halting violence and fostering stability. Juvenile offender cases 
are “difficult but important tests of the general principals that are supposed to be in play 
throughout the [legal] system.”186 The Special Court must, therefore, remain cognizant of 
the macro-level concerns such as stability and the rule of law in adjudicating juvenile 
soldier matters.    
¶ 71 Imprisoning culpable juvenile combatants will solidify the role of the legal 
system in Sierra Leone and broadcast the message that the law must be followed or 
punitive sanctions will be imposed. Punishment encompassing imprisonment must be one 
of the appropriate responses of any legal authority responsible for addressing juvenile 
crimes.187   
¶ 72 Prosecution of juvenile soldiers will also develop Sierra Leonean juvenile law 
jurisprudence.188  Domestic courts can learn much from the Special Court and implement 
progressive domestic changes. Sierra Leonean substantive law will evolve and develop as 
it is utilized in Special Court prosecutions.189  
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189 See Court Statute, supra note 3, at art. 1(1) (stating that the Special Court in adjudicating cases will 
apply both international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law).  
  
¶ 73 Prosecution and sufficient punishment will also establish the moral background 
upon which future generations will be taught right from wrong.190 Because positive 
ingrained societal norms are lacking in Sierra Leone, the Special Court will set a new 
moral code for future generations. It is very important in sentencing that the Court 
considers the “moral-education message to the present and the next generation of children 
in Sierra Leone.”191  
¶ 74 Furthermore, a legitimate legal system in Sierra Leone will directly affect the 
operation of a market economy.192 By establishing a legal system, market participants are 
more likely to invest in the region because they can enlist the help of the law in settling 
grievances.193 A solid legal system will help legitimize the diamond trade in Sierra Leone 
and provide investors incentive to further explore the region. Market growth in Sierra 
Leone will correspondingly provide citizens with jobs, making criminal behavior less 
attractive and assuring an improved quality of life. Regional stability necessarily follows 
from a legitimate and vibrant market economy.   
VI.       Conclusion 
¶ 75 Sierra Leone is currently juggling myriad grim and perplexing problems of global 
significance. The establishment of the Special Court is a momentous step towards 
reconciliation and regional stability, but officials must proceed cautiously, as the Court 
can either stabilize the region and the rule of law or it can further aggrieve the victims. 
Pursuant to its statutory directive to prosecute the most culpable criminals, the Court 
must utilize all available punitive mechanisms to seek truth-based justice and construct 
broad-based respect for the rule of law.   
¶ 76 In a war involving scores of violent juvenile combatants, it is critical to the future 
of Sierra Leone that the Court is vested with jurisdictional authority to fully adjudicate 
these matters. The strict-rehabilitative approach is an insufficient response to the complex 
problems facing Sierra Leone.  
¶ 77 The Court’s primary focus in determining punishments must be both on the micro 
and societal impacts of the punishment, including the benefits of deterrence, retribution, 
regional stability, and the rule of law. Imprisoning the most culpable juveniles serves the 
macro-goals most beneficial to Sierra Leone. In the absence of regional stability, Sierra 
Leone will remain in its decade-long state of mayhem—the ultimate problem the Special 
Court is designed to remedy.         
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¶ 78 The organizational framework for the Special Court offered in this article will 
allow Sierra Leone to emerge from the decade-long conflict holding the key elements to a 
prosperous and stable nation. The U.N. and the Sierra Leonean Government must, 
however, proceed with caution in these volatile times; it must find the correct balance 
between effectuating its citizens’ demands and legitimizing the region’s institutional 
bodies.   
